New Generation Warfare Gaming, Simulation & Analysis

New Generation Warfare Centre Modeling, Gaming, Simulation & Analysis

(doi: 26/8/2025)

The New Generation Warfare Centre’s wargaming/simulation capabilities have a wide range of applications to examine the operational-strategic defense challenges in many countries.  Our approach mirrors that of the Soviets/Russians in that we conduct combat potential modeling evaluations of RED vs BLUE (individual countries or coalitions) across a spectrum of possible scenarios, often following the construct of Net Assessment.

We can explore differing operational concepts and strategies in terms of their overall effectiveness against a range of potential threat scenarios.  We evaluate different configurations of BLUE force structures in terms of warfighting effectiveness or by adding one or more new capabilities and evaluating the impact on the outcome of a conflict.  Our approach allows the RED threat to be varied from current capabilities to a range of possible future capabilities, as well as exploring differing organizational mixes of BLUE or RED or neutral coalitions and reflect changes in strategic objectives. We can also help to explore issues where the host country does not fully understand actual RED strategy and operational art (philosophy) and help them to see through misperception to reality in the eyes of their adversaries: deterrence being in the eye of the beholder!

NGWC explores the interdependency between differing weapon systems, and the effective synergism when used together in various combinations, as well as insight as to which combat systems are the most critical for each time and location of a conflict.  This can include the cost, both to show tradeoffs in total cost by the acquisition, operational organization and readiness approach as well as working the other direction – if only a certain amount of funds is available, what is the most optimum mix of forces (methods and means) and readiness to procure?  Equally important is how any solution might fit synergistically with partner nation capabilities?  NGWC explores variations in operational force organization as to which organization or force structures would be the most effective.  For example, what about creating a new brigade for arctic warfare, how effective might that be and where should it operate from?  Or perhaps what is the benefit of increased Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities and which capabilities within ISR might be of highest advantage in various scenarios?

All non-kinetic activities (hybrid/gray zone/mis-disinformation/cognitive warfare) can be examined concurrently before, during and after a conventional kinetic conflict simulation.  The effects of these actions can be measured qualitatively in the gaming process and where possible reflected quantitatively in the outcomes.  In some cases, NGWC has conducted simulations that focus exclusively on this area, and even more specifically on topics such as information warfare.  Our simulation capabilities allow clients to explore potential force structures and force employment strategies all which can contribute to better planning for the future and more efficient utilization of future investments in military acquisition (in NATO the metric of X% of GDP includes the provision that at least 20% will go towards new military acquisition).   NATO measurements of deterrence and defense would be more accurately calculated by our wargaming simulation and analysis approach than by simply specifying a % of GDP investment.

For the military aspects of wargaming, the NGW Centre operates the LYNX professional simulation system, which has played a crucial role in testing and refining defense strategies for many years. As a result, we actively participate in comprehensive war simulations, providing essential data to support modern defense planning with governments and key defense industry entities.  The Lynx system generates precise maps, battle animations, and effectiveness reports at the battalion, brigade, and company levels. It has been successfully utilized in national military exercises involving key institutions such as the General Staff and the Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces. Additionally, it has supported military exercises on the international stage in countries such as the United States, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania.

NGW Centre tools provide the ability to visualize their different configuration on a map, see the resulting capability, graphically, move by move in the wargame simulation and the remaining strength of the combat units.  After the wargaming simulation a movie is created to visualize the movement of BLUE, RED, coalition and white forces as they move through the geographic features of the conflict location for the duration of hostilities.  When appropriate we have several experienced partners who can create a very high fidelity, physics-based model visualization of tactical to operational scenarios.  The cumulative result of having such simulation tools at a decision maker’s disposal allows for a more fact-based discussion as one can see the effects of various force structures and employment options.  Further, as new questions emerge it is relatively easy to make modification to past simulation efforts to examine new ideas and system concepts and then compare new results with past work.  For example, as observations and lessons learned are accumulated from the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine, these ideas can be tried in simulations against scenarios appropriate for different conflicts and geography to explore how such lessons might apply to other countries and types of military conflicts. 

Typically, the NGW Centre is employed when the host country lacks the wargaming/simulation and analytic traditions in making their military acquisition decisions.  However, even when a country might possess and utilize such analytic skills, the NGW Centre brings into play other perspectives. It might be our superior understanding of how RED will address a military challenge, or it might be experience in understanding how the geography will impact the conflict.  In other cases, we bring to bear our substantial experience having conducted such wargaming simulations and analysis along the north to south front of NATO countries from Svalbard to the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as some experience with the China-Taiwan military challenges.  Those that conduct even the highest quality of analysis know how important it is to see others examining the same problems from another point of view or possessing a different experience set – especially reflecting cultural predispositions.

What makes New Generation Warfare Centre’s wargames different?

(DOI: 26 August 2025)

Most wargames “play” the opponent the “players” worry most about.  Sometimes the “opponent” that has been conjured up bears little resemblance to either the opponent that would have to be confronted or the enemy as it perceived itself.  This latter event is significant because deterrence is in the eye of the beholder – which means that an opponent can only be deterred within his only frame of reference. While it is understandable that Western liberal democracies should want to “play” the opponent they most fear, unfortunately this is frequently not all that is needed for developing the best possible defense posture.  NGW’s strength is in having extensively studied the Soviet/Russian General Staff Academy’s thinking for nearly fifty years.  As a result, NGW can accurately design a game that reflects how the contemporary Russian General Staff would organize an invasion of one or more NATO Member States.  As Putin’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates, however, the Kremlin leadership may not accept the recommendation of the General Staff.  Thus, an NGW game does not claim to be predictive, but only to present the most favorable view of a strategy developed by the best military minds in Moscow.  Getting the Russian General Staff to recommend against a kinetic offensive is the best deterrence outcome that can be hoped for. 

Another advantage of the NGW-organized games is our ability to present a more formidable coalitional approach to the game.  Most “internal” games are constructed on the basis of one’s own assumptions, and frequently to evaluate policy-preferences as opposed to examining the impact of multifarious narrow interests that actually dominate politics.  Having organized games across the entire front from Svalbard in the Arctic to Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, NGW can structure its games to reflect the genuine views of non-sponsoring nation NATO states.  Thus, NGW-organized games can reflect the probable policy-interests of Allied States as opposed to their official public postures.  When representing “uncomfortable views” – both of the enemy and Allies – the players can examine their own assumptions for biases that could in a crisis lead to disaster.  Article Three of the Washington Treaty requires each Member State to defend itself, and a wargame examining how the Russian General Staff would organize an offensive operation against oneself is probably the best “worst-case” possible for self-evaluation.

Having been tutored on military geography by the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Central Europe, General Franz-Joseph Schulze, and having had the opportunity of studying the Soviet Operational Directions planned around the USSR from Kiruna, Norway, to Manzhouli, China, Dr. Phillip A. Petersen has walked, driven over, and flown over this terrain – frequently with escort officers responsible for defending these axes.  In studying the terrain in Poland, Dr. Petersen has worked closely with Europe’s current leading military geographer, Wojciech Zalewski – who happens to also be Europe’s leading producer of wargames.  In fact, America’s Potomac Foundation engaged Zalewski to develop wargames on concrete tactical engagements to assist Ukrainian commanders prepare for Russian attacks in Donbas.  Zalewski’s company – Taktyka i Strategia – is the New Generation Warfare Centre’s strategic partner in providing combat potential modeling support for our wargames.  Petersen and Zalewski have coauthored many studies of European military terrain and collaborate extensively on each of NGWC’s wargames – with Petersen bringing the knowledge of Russian General Staff thinking and planning, and Zalewski contributing his extensive historical knowledge of the local terrain.  Their collaboration is not a map exercise, but a practical conversation involving the evaluation of Russian assessments against their “terrain walk” and subsequent conversations with BLUE-side commanders responsible for defending this very terrain.  This professional collaboration in the field is precisely why NGW “outcomes” differ so radically from the academic map-based wargames of more prominent American think-tanks.  The NGW Centre is not a think-tank, but a “do-tank” – as we take special pride in walking the terrain we’re going to “talk” about fighting over with those men and women responsible for its defense.

A last area of uniqueness is that our war game modeling efforts employs the same combat potential modeling introduced to the Soviet General Staff by Dr. Vitalii Tsygichko and Andrei Piontkovsky, and which Russia continues to employ.  Given that wargames are not absolute predictors of outcome, we do not attempt to add false fidelity and precision in our efforts allowing for relatively quick computation of outcomes and the ability to quickly adapt the scenario and capabilities being used to different mixes of forces and capability.  Further we keep our focus at the operational-strategic level, going no lower than operational-tactical as most countries have wargaming tools to train their forces at the tactical level.